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The Dormant Seizure Doctrine and Its Effect on Race Disparities  
    By: Joseph Alter 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In most circumstances, the seizure of a person is easy to spot. When one thinks of police 
“seizing” a suspect, perhaps images of a police officer handcuffing or tackling a suspect to the 
ground come to mind. That would be accurate, as these types of physical restraints 
understandably fall within the United States Supreme Court’s definition of “seizure.”1 But what 
about the less obvious methods of police controlling or attempting to control the body of a 
suspect? If police are simply asking questions of someone, is that a seizure? What if they ask 
questions for hours without telling the person they can leave? What if they shoot or attempt to 
shoot a suspect, but he or she manages to escape? What if a suspect gives police permission to 
search them, but the permission is given under duress or coercive circumstances? These 
questions represent the more difficult side of seizure doctrine, and the Court has at one point or 
another attempted to answer them all, with confusing and often unreasonable results.  
 The Supreme Court’s seizure doctrine becomes more complex when examined in the 
light of the current national dialogue the United States is having about law enforcement’s 
disparate treatment of minority communities—the Black community in particular. Ample 
research shows higher arrest, conviction, and imprisonment rates for people of color. In today’s 
world, in which there is a seemingly endless series of cases in which Black individuals are killed 
 
1 California v. Hodari, D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). (A Fourth Amendment seizure requires “either physical force 
or, where that is absent, submission to assertion of authority”).  
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or injured due to the excessive or unnecessary force used on them by police2, many are calling on 
the Court to do something to alleviate this unjust and heartbreaking reality. One of the primary 
ways it can do so is to include race as a factor when determining certain types of seizures in 
order to reflect the reality that minorities are treated differently by police, and as a result, they 
understand and experience interactions with the police differently.  
The Supreme Court’s attempts at defining what is and is not a seizure have engendered 
and fostered a system in which law enforcement can not-so-covertly discriminate based on race, 
but the Court has taken any chances of discussing race in the seizure context completely off the 
table.3 All of the Court’s rulings on this point have operated to treat all Americans the same in 
their interactions with law enforcement. Despite statistics and current events undercutting that 
notion, the Court has not changed its tune, and shows very little signs of doing so in the future. 
An in-depth analysis of where American seizure law came from, how it developed, how it has 
disadvantaged minority communities, and what to do about it is imperative.  
I. ROOTS OF SEIZURE DOCTRINE  
In order to examine or analyze modern day seizure law, it is necessary to look into the history 
of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This is because the United States 
Supreme Court decides current seizure cases based largely on what the Founding Fathers thought 
about the issue4. The rationale behind the Fourth Amendment’s enactment continues to color 
how and when a seizure is deemed unconstitutional. Examining the history of the Fourth 
Amendment reveals that some of the modern seizure practices deemed constitutional may not 
 
2 Some recent examples include George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, Rayshard Brooks, Jacob Blake, Elijah McClain, 
Philando Castile, Daniel Prude, Duante Wright, Samuel DuBose, Alonzo Smith, Atatiana Jefferson, and many more.  
 
3 Torres v. Madrid, 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021). 
4 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175 (2008). 
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fully match up with the expectations the Framers had in mind when they argued for and wrote 
the amendment.  
A. The History of the Fourth Amendment 
 Despite consisting of just over fifty words, the Fourth Amendment has and continues to be a 
highly debated and controversial area of law, and our understanding and interpretation of it has 
changed depending on the decade and the makeup of the Supreme Court. The Amendment, in its 
entirety, states: 
The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
persons or things to be seized.5 
 
The key word in the amendment is “unreasonable”, and its placement suggests 
that the Framers did not intend to prohibit all searches and seizures, but rather only ones 
they considered to be unreasonable. This is where the debate begins and never truly 
ends, as a court’s determination of what exactly it considered to be unreasonable in 
1789 can mean the difference between a defendant’s freedom, incarceration, or ability 
to obtain a civil remedy in 2021. But this determination is no easy task, and to 
accomplish it requires an analysis of why the Framers felt the need to enact the Fourth 
Amendment in the first place.  
The idea that people should be secure in their own houses, which birthed the 
Fourth Amendment, did not start with the Founding Fathers. Like much of American 
common law, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence can be traced back to England. One of 
the first English cases to deal with the issue of safeguarding the home from government 
 
5 U.S. Const., amend. IV.  
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interference was Semayne’s Case in 1604, in which Sir Edward Coke declared, “the 
house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well as for his defence against 
injury and violence as for his repose.”6 Despite this recognition, Semayne’s Case 
allowed for the breaking and entering of a home in many circumstances, as long as the 
owner or tenant of the home was notified in advance of the sheriff’s arrival, and a 
request was made by the sheriff to enter once he did arrive.7 One of these circumstances 
was “execution of the King’s process”, as one of the holdings of the case was that “the 
liberty of the house does not hold against the King.”8 This meant that sheriffs could still 
enter a home for essentially any reason, as long as it was on behalf of the King and they 
announced their presence before entering. This paved the way for writs of assistance, or 
general warrants, created by Parliament in the 17th Century.9 These warrants authorized 
government officials to enter private homes and businesses to search and seize 
contraband, with essentially zero limitations on the time or scope of the search and 
seizure.10 
As one might expect, the notion that a sheriff or soldier may enter a home at any 
time and search and seize anything on behalf of the King was not met with much 
enthusiasm. In the 1760s, targets of these general warrant searches increasingly started 
to sue the officers who conducted them. The most notable of these targets was John 
Wilkes, a British radical and member of Parliament who penned publications critical of 
King George III.11 One of these publications was “The North Briton,” a newspaper that 
 
6 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).  
7 Id. This is the origin of the modern-day “knock and announce” rule. 
8 Id. 
9 George Elliott Howard, Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763-1777, 73 (1906).  
10 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. §5(2) (1662).  
11 Jack Lynch, Wilkes, Liberty, and Number 45. Colonial Williamsburg Journal. (2003). 
https://research.colonialwilliamsburg.org/Foundation/journal/summer03/wilkes.cfm . 
 6 
Wilkes wrote anonymously.12 After reading a particularly critical issue of the 
newspaper, the King ordered the issuance of general warrants which authorized the 
arrest of the printers, publishers, and authors of “The North Briton”, without identifying 
any of them by name.13 Wilkes sued the King’s messengers for trespassing on his 
property and arresting him under a general warrant and encouraged other printers and 
publishers who were similarly targeted under the general warrants to do the same.14  
One of those publishers was John Entick, an associate of Wilkes whose house 
was forcibly broken into by the King’s chief messenger, Nathan Carrington.15 
Carrington broke into locked desks and boxes and seized many pamphlets and charts, 
causing a great deal of damage.16 Like Wilkes, Entick sued Carrington for trespass and 
the resulting litigation, Entick v. Carrington, became a landmark civil liberty case in 
Great Britain and a primary motivation for the Founding Fathers to enact the Fourth 
Amendment. In Entick, the Court held the general warrants in question to be subversive 
“of all comforts of society.”17 Specifically, the court took issue with the absence of 
probable cause. The court stated, “The great end, for which men entered into society, 
was to secure their property.”18 The U.S. Supreme Court has characterized Entick as “a 
great judgment,” “one of the landmarks of English liberty,” and characterized it as a 
guide to understanding of what the Framers meant in writing the Fourth Amendment.19  
 
12 Id.  
13 Id.  
14 Id.  
15 Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B 275, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).  
16 Id.  
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).  
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In the American colonies, similar opposition to general warrants were taking 
place. Perhaps the most famous of such opposition came from Massachusetts lawyer 
James Otis in the 1761 Writ of Assistance Case, in which he advocated on behalf of 
Boston merchants petitioning the Massachusetts Superior Court to challenge the legality 
of writs of assistance.20 In his scathing attack on the writ, Otis described them as a 
“power that places the liberty of every man in the hand of every petty officer.21” He also 
brought up what was first mentioned over a century earlier in Semayne’s Case, likening 
the right to treat one’s house as their castle: 
“A man’s house is his castle, and whilst he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a 
prince in his castle. This writ, if it should be declared legal, would totally 
annihilate this privilege. Custom house officers may enter our houses when they 
please; we are commanded to permit their entry. Their menial servants may enter, 
may break locks, bars, and everything in their way; and whether they break 
through malice or revenge, no man, no court, can inquire. Bare suspicion without 
oath is sufficient. This wanton exercise of this power is not a chimerical suggestion 
of a heated brain…What a scene does this open! Every man, prompted by revenge, 
ill humor, or wantonness to inspect the inside of his neighbor’s house, may get a 
writ of assistance. Others will ask it from self-defense; one arbitrary exertion will 
provoke another, until society be involved in tumult and blood.”22 
 
Despite losing the case, Otis was successful insofar as galvanizing the colonies into the 
revolutionary spirit. John Adams, who was present in the courtroom for Otis’s speech, 
later remarked, “then and there, the child Independence was born.”23  
The idea that general warrants were illegal and an affront to personal liberty 
continued, so that when the colonies established independent governments in 1776, many 
of them prohibited general warrants. For example, Article I, Section X of the Virginia 
 
20 Richard Morris, “Then and there the child independence was born,” American Heritage Vol. 13, Issue 2, (Feb. 
1962). https://www.americanheritage.com/then-and-there-child-independence-was-born. 
21 John Adam’s Reconstruction of Otis’s Speech in the Writs of Assistance Case, in The Collected Political Writings 
of James Otis, Ed. Richard A. Samuelson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2015), 11-4. 
Http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2703.  
22 Id.  
23 Richard Morris, Supra Note 18. 
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Declaration of Rights, states: “That general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger 
may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or 
to seize any person or persons not named, or whose offense is not particularly described 
and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be granted.”24 
Massachusetts enacted a similar provision in their declaration of Rights, written by John 
Adams, which stressed the “right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and 
seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.”25 These 
prohibitions served as the basis for the language of the Fourth Amendment. Placing that 
amendment in the context of the time it was written and all that preceded it, it becomes 
clear that the Founding Fathers found searches and seizures to be unreasonable when they 
were done arbitrarily or at the whim of a tyrannical government, without any regard to 
the personal liberties or freedoms of the subject of the search or seizure. Further, their 
adamant opposition to general warrants would seem to indicate a low level of tolerance 
for warrantless searches and seizures. Their addition of “probable cause” as necessary in 
order to obtain a warrant for searches and seizures seems to drive this point home and 
stress how necessary it was to provide limitations on when searches and seizures would 
be permissible. However, as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed into what we 
see in the modern age, an important question must be asked: Has the Court permitted the 
very practices the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent? 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SEIZURE DOCTRINE 
While search doctrine has bred an enormous amount of case law, controversy, and 
exceptions, seizure doctrine has gotten very little attention in comparison. This is 
 
24 VA. Const. art. 1, § 10.  
25 MA. Const. § 1, art. 14.  
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especially curious considering the interests involved. Search doctrine is about the privacy 
of what we do and keep in our homes, businesses, papers, and effects. Seizure doctrine is 
about depriving one of their personal liberty, often accompanied by handcuffs and trips to 
the police station. If faced with the choice between liberty and privacy, what would you 
chose? Of course, there are instances in which privacy is a higher value than liberty, but 
on balance, the idea of being restrained and whisked away should count at least as 
equally, if not more than privacy. But given the sizeable disparity in how the Supreme 
Court has treated the two doctrines, that does not appear to be the case.  
A. Terry v. Ohio: Seizures Absent Probable Cause and Arrest 
Until 1968, “probable cause” was an all-or-nothing concept. Either you had it, and 
the search/seizure was reasonable, or you didn’t, and the search/seizure was 
unreasonable.26 Probable cause was loosely defined by the Supreme Court as “where the 
facts and circumstances within the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have 
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a belief by a 
man of reasonable caution that a crime is being committed.”27 This would seem to 
comport with the Founders’ thinking in that it would bar arbitrary searches and seizures. 
Only where there was a specific basis and sufficient and trustworthy information to 
support the search/seizure, would a warrant be issued, making it reasonable.  
 All of this came to a screeching halt in Terry v. Ohio28. In that case, Officer 
McFadden, a Cleveland Police Officer, witnessed two African American men repeatedly 
 
26 There were some exceptions in which discerning probable cause was tricker. See Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307 (1959), in which the issue before the Court was whether an informant’s descriptive tip to police was 
sufficient to establish Probable Cause.  
27 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).  
28 329 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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peering into a store window and then walking away to converse with a different man.29 
Finding this to be inherently suspicious, the officer approached the men and asked for 
their names.30 Richard Terry mumbled something in response, which prompted the 
officer to grab him (a seizure), spin him around, and pat the outside of his clothing (a 
search).31 The officer testified that this search and seizure was performed to see if Terry 
was armed.32 However, based on the judicially defined probable cause standard and the 
facts of the case, probable cause did not exist.33 Thus, the issue in the case was whether it 
is always unreasonable for an officer, without probable cause or a warrant, to seize a 
person and perform a limited search for weapons.34 In an 8-1 decision authored by Chief 
Justice Warren, the court answered no, and its holding had a tremendous impact on the 
Fourth Amendment and future interactions between police officers and civilians.35  
The impact Terry had on the Fourth Amendment cannot be overstated. For the 
first time, the Supreme Court held specific searches and seizures to be constitutionally 
permissible without a warrant or probable cause, the two ingredients the Founders 
deemed necessary in the text of the Fourth Amendment.36 It went about this by 
recognizing that searches and seizures can vary in their level of intrusiveness. In making 
that recognition, the Court reasoned that the appropriate test for search and seizure is not 
whether there was a warrant or probable cause, but instead by focusing on the nature of 
 
29 Id. at 6.  
30 Id.  
31 Id. at 7.  
32 Id. 
33 Had Officer McFadden applied for a warrant and described only what he had seen —two men repeatedly looking 
into a store window and walking away to talk to a third man—it likely would not have been issued.  
34 Id. at 15.  
35 Id. at 29.  
36 Id. 
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the intrusion as it relates to privacy interests37. This was because the Court believed some 
searches and seizures fall so low on the spectrum as to require a lesser standard than 
probable cause.38 Thus, what was later deemed the “reasonable suspicion” standard was 
born.39 By creating this standard, and thus a way for police to search and seize people 
without probable cause, the Court tampered with the Fourth Amendmen by effectively 
driving a wedge between the first clause, which prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures, and the second, which seemingly allows them only when probable cause exists.   
The reasonable suspicion standard is highly deferential to law enforcement. It 
allows police to temporarily seize a person and conduct “careful exploration[s] of the 
outer surfaces of a person’s clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find 
weapons,”40 as long as the officer can point to some “specific and articulable facts” that 
justify their actions41. Any facts or observations that lead an officer to believe his safety 
was in question would likely justify the search and seizure.42 The Terry Court did not do 
much further elaboration on the definition of the reasonable suspicion standard, or how to 
know if an officer went too far. In terms of a definition, it said in a later case that the 
standard cannot be “readily, or even usefully reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”43 In 
terms of evaluating whether an officer did or did not have reasonable suspicion when 
conducting a Terry-type search or seizure, the court said it would make this determination 
based on “the totality of the circumstances.”44 It also described the reasonable suspicion 
 
37 Id. at 24.  
38 Id. at 25.  
39 Despite being famous for creating the “reasonable suspicion” standard, the Terry opinion never mentions those 
words.  
40 Id. at 16.  
41 Id. at 21.  
42 Id. at 30. 
43 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).  
44 Id. 
 12 
standard as “obviously less demanding than that for probable cause,” and requiring 
“considerably less” proof of wrongdoing.45 In another case, the court said all that is 
necessary for reasonable suspicion is “some minimal level of objective justification.”46 
The Court has also conceded that “In allowing such detention, Terry accepts the risk that 
officers may stop innocent people.”47 By making it easy for police officers to satisfy 
reasonable suspicion, the Court gave them a tremendous amount of power to stop and 
seize people on the street. Yale Kamisar, a constitutional law professor and author, 
explains that “Terry established a spongy test, one that allowed the police so much room 
to maneuver and furnished the courts so little basis for meaningful review, that the 
opinion must have been the cause for celebration in a good number of police stations.”48 
Terry impacted more than just probable cause. The case also had significant 
effects on how the Fourth Amendment should apply to seizures. This is because for the 
first time, The Supreme Court recognized that a person can be seized short of being 
arrested.49 Chief Justice Warren believed a Fourth Amendment seizure to occur 
“whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk 
away.”50 The Chief Justice specified a bit further in dicta, stating that “only when the 
officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Despite the first 
judicial recognition of a seizure as something short of an arrest, the Terry Court raised 
more questions than answers. The Court concluded, “We thus decide nothing today 
 
45 Id. 
46 Ins v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).  
47 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000).  
48 Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 Tulsa L.J. 1, 5 
(1995).  
49 Terry, 329 U.S. 1 at 16.  
50 Id. at 19, n. 16.  
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concerning the constitutional propriety of an investigative “seizure” upon less than 
probable cause for purposes of “detention” and/or interrogation.”51  The Court attempted 
to answer that question in the future with some confusing results, as the threshold 
questions of whether, when, and how someone is seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment are issues still being litigated today.  
B. Seizure Doctrine After Terry: Mendenhall and the Reasonable Person 
Test 
 
After Terry recognized that one can be seized by police without being arrested, 
the question of what constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure remained largely 
unanswered. The Supreme Court started to give seizure doctrine some rigid contours in 
the early 1980’s, spurred by the questionable constitutionality of police efforts to combat 
the war on drugs. In the 1980 case of Mendenhall v. United States52, the Court solidified 
its definition of seizure and introduced a new objective standard by which to measure 
whether one had occurred: the “reasonable person test.”53  
Mendenhall established two main pathways for a Fourth Amendment seizure to 
occur: the application of physical force by an officer on the subject, or the subject’s 
submission to an officer’s show of authority.54 Seizures are easier to recognize in the 
former pathway, as physical force on a subject is usually self-evident. But seizures by 
submission can be more difficult because submitting to an officer’s show of authority can 
occur in multiple contexts, and merely accepting an officer’s request to have a 
conversation is not always a seizure. This difficulty is represented in Mendenhall, and the 
 
51 Id. 
52 446 U.S. 544 (1980).  
53 Id. at 554. 
54 Id. at 552. 
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Court attempted to resolve it by creating the “reasonable person test,” which asks whether 
“in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would 
have believed that he was not free to leave.”55 If the Court answers that question in the 
negative, then the subject cannot be deemed to have submitted to the officer’s show of 
authority, and therefore a Fourth Amendment seizure has not occurred.    
The dispute in Mendenhall arose when Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agents at airport used a “drug courier” profile to approach Sylvia Mendenhall, a twenty-
two-year-old African American woman.56 Believing her conduct was indicative of 
someone illegally trafficking narcotics, the officers confronted Mendenhall as she was 
walking through the airport concourse and asked to examine her ticket and 
identification.57 They noticed that the name on her identification was different than the 
one on her ticket and asked her to accompany them to their office, which she did.58 Once 
at the office, Mendenhall consented to a search of her person, which turned up nothing.59 
Undeterred, the officers asked for a more invasive search, which would require 
Mendenhall to take off her clothes.60 Despite initially protesting and claiming she had “a 
plane to catch”, Mendenhall eventually complied with the search, in which she produced 
a bag of heroin from her undergarments.61 She argued that this incident was an 
unreasonable seizure.62 
 
55 Id. at 554.  
56 Id. at 548. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 549 
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 565 (Powell, J., Concurring).   
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The Supreme Court’s analysis of the case was split, with only Justices Stewart 
and Rehnquist considering the issue of whether a seizure occurred when the DEA agents 
first stopped Mendenhall in the airport concourse. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Chief 
Justice Burger believed that the officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop 
Mendenhall from the outset, primarily because of their use of a drug courier profile and 
the high public interest in stopping narcotics trafficking.63 On the other hand, Justice 
Stewart’s plurality opinion (which only Justice Rehnquist joined) did not believe the 
initial stop of Mendenhall constituted a seizure.64 Applying the dicta from Terry v. Ohio, 
in which the Court defined a seizure as “only when the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,” Justice 
Stewart pointed to the absence of a physical restraint or show of authority to reach the 
conclusion that Mendenhall was not seized when she was originally approached and 
questioned by the DEA agents.65 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stewart explained 
that in his view, Mendenhall had no reason to believe that she was not free to just walk 
away from the officers.66 This meant that no seizure had occurred because, according to 
the plurality, “a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”67 Thus, the “reasonable person test” 
was born out of a two-justice plurality opinion.  
 
63 Id. at 565 (Powell, J., Concurring).   
64 Id. at 557. 
65 Id. at 554 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
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In addition, Justice Stewart introduced some factors that courts should use in 
determining whether the reasonable person test is satisfied. These include the number of 
officers involved in the encounter (the more officers, the more threatening of a presence 
and the less likely the subject feels free to leave), the display of weapon by an officer, 
physical touching, and the language or tone of voice indicating that compliance might be 
compelled.68 What is specifically excluded from the test, however, is the agent’s 
subjective intent when approaching the defendant.69 Similarly, the subjective impression 
of the suspect is also irrelevant in the analysis, except to the extent that a reasonable 
person in that suspect’s situation would have the same concerns.70 This is because the 
plurality intended for the reasonable person test to be objectively applied to the facts of 
each case.  
The reasonable person test is not without its critics. For example, Justice White, in 
his Mendenhall dissent, questioned how a reasonable person in Mendenhall’s position 
could have felt free to leave the DEA agents and board a plane after having her ticket and 
driver’s license taken from her.71 He also did not think Mendenhall’s conduct was 
sufficient to establish the reasonable suspicion necessary to seize her.72  Many critics also 
posit that a reasonable person always feels restricted when they are confronted by police, 
and thus no one truly feels free to simply terminate a police encounter.73 Finally, by 
ignoring the subjective impressions of both the police officer and the person seized, the 
reasonable person standard fails to take into account how racism may play a role in who 
 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at n. 6. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 570, n. 6 (White, J., dissenting) 
72 Id. at 572 (White, J., dissenting).  
73 See David K. Kessler, Free to Leave—An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard , 99 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 51 (2008-2009).  
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police approach for questioning, and how the race of the person being questioned may 
affect how subjectively threatened they may feel.74 Despite these criticisms and the fact 
that the reasonable person test stems seemingly out of nowhere from a two-justice 
plurality, the test continued to gain judicial approval and is still a crucial part of the 
Supreme Court’s seizure jurisprudence today.  
Since 1980, the reasonable person test has been used to decide a variety of cases 
in favor of law enforcement, with the Supreme Court deeming some questionable police 
tactics as not threatening for the purposes of answering the seizure question. One of the 
most notorious examples of this is the 1991 case of Florida v. Bostick75. There, narcotics 
officers boarded an interstate bus as part of a drug interdiction effort and began asking 
seated passengers for identification, tickets, and permission to search their luggage.76 
These searches were completely warrantless and suspicionless and depended on the 
consent of the subjects.77 One of these subjects was the defendant, who consented to a 
search that revealed drugs.78 He argued that a reasonable person in similar conditions 
would not feel free to terminate the encounter with the officer.79 The Florida Supreme 
Court agreed, so much so that it adopted a per se rule prohibiting this type of police 
practice in the future.80 But the U.S Supreme Court reversed, and despite calling this 
practice “distasteful,” it found that it was the fact that the defendant was on a bus, not the 
coercive actions of the police, that made the defendant feel like he could not leave.81 
 
74 See Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue Encounters—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: 
Should Race Matter? 26 Val. U.L. Rev. 243 (1991).  
75 501 U.S. 429 (1991).  
76 Id. at 431.  
77 Id. at 432.  
78 Id. at 433.  
79 Id. at 435.  
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 439 
 18 
Through this holding, the Court allowed warrantless, suspicionless searches of buses for 
the purposes of drug interdiction.  
III. REVISITING SEIZURE DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF RACE  
Throughout its analysis and application of the reasonable person test, the Supreme 
Court has consistently sanctioned the use of coercive police practices that are used 
disproportionately against people of color. The Court rarely mentions race or the 
overwhelming evidence of racism it has at its disposal. Instead, by making the objective 
analysis of the reasonable person test the focal point, the Court has been able to escape 
bringing up the obvious question of whether the race of the person being seized plays a 
role on whether that person feels as though they could simply terminate the encounter 
with a police officer and leave. It’s time for that to change.  
A. Racist Roots of Seizure Law: Slave Patrols 
At the same time the Founding Fathers were complaining and revolting against 
oppressive British search and seizure measures, the colonies were searching and seizing Black 
people through far worse measures. Most of this was done by “slave patrols.”82 In 1693, court 
officials in Philadelphia responded to complaints about the congregating and traveling of Blacks 
without their masters by authorizing the constables and citizens of the city to “take up” any 
Black person seen “gadding abroad” without a pass from his or her master.83 In 1696, South 
Carolina, initiated a series of measures authorizing state slave patrols to search the homes of 
slaves for weapons on a weekly basis.84 In 1712, these “slave patrols” increased to being 
performed on a bi-weekly basis, and the scope of the searches increased from weapons to “any 
 
82 Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 Vanderbilt Law Review 331 (1998). Available at: 
https://sochalrship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol51/iss2/2.  
83 Id. at 334. 
84 Id.  
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contraband.”85 Ten years later, these patrols were allowed to forcibly enter the home of any 
house they suspected Black people may be found, and to detain any “suspicious Blacks” they 
came across.86 In 1737, slave patrols could search any tavern they thought might be serving 
Black people.87 By 1740, justices of the peace could seize any slave suspected of any crime 
“whatsoever.”88 
 Slave patrols in Virginia were similarly authorized to arrest slaves on “bare suspicion.”89 
If a Black person’s presence “excited suspicion,” slave patrols could arrest them.90 In Virginia 
slave patrols, “no neutral and detached magistrate intervened between a patrolman’s suspicions 
and his power to arrest or search.”91 The same can be said of patrols in Virginia’s neighboring 
southern colonies. A Black resident of Savannah in 1767 wrote that slave patrols would “enter 
the house of any Black person who kept his lights on after 9 P.M. and fine, flog and extort food 
from him.”92 Interestingly, around the same time, James Otis was speaking out about British 
oppression through the use of general warrants and comparing a man’s house to his castle. 
Obviously, this was only the case for white men.  
Slave patrols seizing Black people that “excite suspicion” should sound familiar. Despite 
taking place in the 17th and 18th centuries, these slave patrols are reminiscent of what the 
Supreme Court authorized in Terry v. Ohio. By allowing law enforcement to confront and seize 
people who “arouse suspicion,” and by analyzing these confrontations without considering race, 
the Supreme Court was ushering in the modern equivalent of slave patrols. Under this regime, 
 









just like slave patrols, Black people are systematically targeted because their skin color arouses 
“suspicion.” They are seized and searched through means only recently deemed constitutional by 
the Supreme Court. Finally, if the suspicions of “law enforcement” happen to be correct, they are 
subject to cruel punishment—namely, extremely harsh and unwarranted prison sentences. In 
2017, the United States Sentencing Commission reported that “Black male offenders received 
sentences on average 19.1 percent longer than similarly situated white male offenders.”93 
B. Effects of Supreme Court Seizure Doctrine on Racial Minorities.  
The Supreme Court’s seizure jurisprudence has had a disparate impact on racial 
minorities, especially African Americans. To illustrate this point, an examination of the above-
mentioned seizure doctrine cases in the context of how they have affected minority communities 
is necessary. The best place to start is Terry v. Ohio, which, as previously mentioned, introduced 
and validated the concept of a “stop-and-frisk” based on “reasonable suspicion.”  
One major issue the Terry case discusses, but does little to combat, is race. By deferring 
to a police officer’s experience and training in determining whether or not they fear for their 
safety94, the Court made it easy for police officers with more racist intentions to justify seizing 
minorities in order to check for weapons. Chief Justice Earl Warren seemed to acknowledge this 
point in Terry when he said that the case “thrusts to the fore, difficult and troublesome issues 
regarding a sensitive area of police activity.”95 According to a New York County District 
Attorney amicus brief filed in Terry, 1600 police reports of stops-and-frisks by the NYPD 
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“showed a disproportionate racial impact of those actions.”96 For an example of a racially 
motivated stop-and-frisk, look no further than facts of Terry.  
Believing the stop in Terry may have been racially motivated, Louis Stokes, 
Terry’s defense attorney, asked Officer McFadden what exactly it was about the 
defendants and their actions that aroused his suspicion.97 McFadden replied, “Well, to tell 
you the truth, I just didn’t like ‘em.”98 After going on to say that he thought they were 
“casing the joint for the purpose of robbing it,” he was asked if he had ever in his thirty-
nine years as a police officer observed anybody casing a store for a robbery.99 He replied 
that he had not.100 He was then asked again what attracted him to the defendants, and 
again indicated that he just did not like them. This is not surprising to many people of 
color, as Tracey Maclin explains, “In America, police targeting of Black people for 
excessive and disproportionate search and seizure is a practice older than the Republic 
itself.”101 
The general efficacy of stop-and-frisk on crime reduction is highly debated, but there can 
be no question that even in the 21st century, it continues to be used overwhelmingly on racial 
minorities. For example, in 1999, African Americans made up 50 percent of New York’s 
population, but accounted for 84 percent of the city’s stops.102 Between 2004 and 2012, the 
NYPD made 4.4 million stops under their stop-and-frisk policy.103 More than 80 percent of those 
4.4 million people were Black and Latino.104 Interestingly, despite the entire justification for a 
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stop being officer safety (to search for weapons), the likelihood of a Black New Yorker found to 
be yielding a weapon was half that of white New Yorkers.105 The likelihood of finding 
contraband on a Black New Yorker was one third of that for a white New Yorker.106 In 2017, 90 
percent of those stopped in New York City were Black or Latino and almost 70 percent of those 
stopped were innocent.107 According to the NYPD annual reports, 13,459 stops were recorded in 
2019, with 7,981 of them being Black, 1,215 being white, and 8,867 being innocent.108 The 
NYPD data breaking down Terry stops by race goes back as far as 2003. Every single year since 
then, Black people have made up over half of all those searched.109 If these numbers prove 
anything, it’s that stop-and-frisk policies disproportionately target racial minorities, and that the 
overwhelming majority of those stopped are innocent. Thanks to Terry, even if the primary 
motivation behind the stops is racial bias, it’s irrelevant because the subjective motivations of the 
officer are not considered by the Court.  
The Supreme Court continued the trend of discounting an officer’s subjective motivations 
behind a seizure—this time, in the context of traffic stops—in Whren v. United States110, where it 
unanimously held that pretextual traffic stops do not raise Fourth Amendment concerns.111 In 
that case, police officers saw two African American men driving in a car and believed, without 
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, that they were committing drug crimes.112 In order 
to investigate further, they followed the car and eventually observed the d river make a turn 
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stopped the car, found drugs, and arrested the men.114 The defendants contended that this was an 
unconstitutional seizure because the officers did not intend to issue a citation when they stopped 
the car and relied on racial profiling instead of reasonable suspicion.115 Justice Scalia authored 
the opinion that it did not matter if police officers have ulterior or nefarious motives when 
stopping automobiles for minor traffic infractions because Fourth Amendment analysis does not 
inquire into the subjective mental state of police officers.116 
But perhaps if the court in Whren did allow an analysis on the subjective mental state of 
police officers, the staggering evidence of pretextual stops might be too damning to ignore. Some 
of the most recent evidence comes from the Stanford University’s Open Policing Project, which, 
using information obtained through public record requests, examined almost 100 million traffic 
stops conducted from 2011 to 2017 across 21 state patrol agencies and 29 municipal police 
departments. The results show that race is a factor when people are pulled over, and that this 
problem is occurring on national scale. Black and Latino drivers are stopped and searched based 
on less evidence than white drivers, but white drivers are more likely to be found with illegal 
items.117 Across states, contraband was found in 36 percent of searches of white drivers, 
compared to 32 percent for Black drivers, and 26 percent of Latinos.118 These statistics are not 
surprising to people of color, who refer to this phenomenon as the crime of “driving while 
Black.”119 
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Minority communities are not just subject to arbitrary and racially motivated stops on the 
streets and in their cars. Public transportation has become a place for law enforcement to target 
them as well, thanks to cases like Bostick, which held that suspicionless bus sweeps in which 
police question passengers and ask permission to search their bodies and luggage would not 
communicate to a reasonable passenger that they were not free to leave and thus, it is not a 
seizure. Putting aside the questionable truthfulness of that assertion, the main criticism of Bostick 
has centered around its impact on minority groups. The Bostick majority had evidence of the 
large role that race played in bus sweeps but remained largely silent on the issue. In his dissent, 
Thurgood Marshall, then the first and only Black person on the Supreme Court, wrote, “the basis 
of the decision to single out particular passengers during a suspicionless sweep is less likely to be 
inarticulable than unspeakable.”120 In addition to this dissent, the Court received an amicus brief 
filed by the ACLU which claimed, “insofar as the facts of reported bus interdiction cases 
indicate, the defendants all appear to be Black or Hispanic.”121  Even Americans for Effective 
Law enforcement, an organization which prior to Bostick had filed 86 amicus briefs in the 
Supreme Court supporting the interests of law enforcement, argued that drug interdiction raids 
on buses violated the Fourth Amendment and alluded to the discriminatory impact that these 
confrontations had on minority citizens.122 They explained that the Court has not extended the 
rationale of prior cases authorizing suspicionless seizures to the setting of passengers sitting on a 
bus and “moreover, any such extension would be constitutionally invalid…setting aside equal 
protection issues, it is difficult to imagine a scenario of police activities, as in the present case, 
upon a planeload of business class air passengers arriving at a busy air terminal after an interstate 
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flight.”123 Despite alarming evidence that bus sweeps were being used to specifically target 
minority groups and the implications that constitutionalizing them would have on these groups, 
the Court simply ran the scenario through the reasonable person test and concluded that it did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Over a decade after Bostick, the Court held the same way on similar facts in United States 
v. Drayton124. In that case, the Court held that during bus sweeps, police do not even have to 
inform the subjects of the sweep that they have the right to say no to questioning.125 The Court 
again made this determination by using the reasonable person test, concluding that even if a 
reasonable person is not made aware by an officer requesting to search them that they can 
decline, they still feel as though that in an option.126 But research reveals otherwise. An 
examination of the existing empirical evidence of the psychology of coercion suggests that in 
many situations where citizens find themselves in an encounter with the police, the encounter is 
not consensual because a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate it.127 Such evidence 
suggests that the subsequent search is not voluntary, because a reasonable person would not be, 
under the totality of the circumstances, in a position to make a voluntary decision about consent. 
This is especially true in the context of bus sweeps. Michelle Alexander put it best when she said 
“consent searches are valuable tools for the police only because hardly anyone says no.”128  
If a “reasonable person” would have a hard time saying no to consent searches, this is 
especially true for a reasonable person of color. From all the data we now have available, it is 
obvious that Black and brown people are targeted and harassed by police at a higher rate than 
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whites. According to a 2020 Kaiser Family Foundation poll, 71 percent of Black Americans said 
they have experienced some form of racial discrimination or mistreatment during their 
lifetimes.129 48 percent said that at a point, they felt their life was in danger because of their 
race.130 41 percent of Black Americans said they have been stopped or detained by police 
because of their race.131 In comparison, only 3 percent of white people report these types of 
negative police interactions in their lifetimes.132 This disparity gives credence to claims that there 
are really “two Americas”, one for white people, who get to go about their business largely 
unaffected and unbothered by police, and one for Black Americans, who feel as though they are 
walking through life with a permanent target on their backs. When the Supreme Court applies an 
objective “reasonable person” test, it is, whether knowingly or not, applying a “reasonable white 
person” test. By keeping things as objective as possible, the law can continue to find the 
subjective experiences of minorities with police to be irrelevant when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment.  
C. Current Events Suggest the Time is Ripe for the Supreme Court to 
Reconsider and Redevelop Seizure Doctrine in the Same Way it has 
Treated Search Doctrine 
 
Despite the obvious fact that racism has existed in America since before its 
founding, the events of the summer of 2020 and death of George Floyd at the hands of 
police triggered a pivotal national dialogue concerning racial inequality and civil rights in 
America. This dialogue cast a burning spotlight on the issue of police mistreatment of the 
Black community and resulted in the Black Lives Matter movement garnering national 
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attention133, which amplified their calls for justice on a global scale. This long-overdue 
discussion prompted outraged citizens of all races to protest and stand behind the Black 
Lives Matter movement as they demanded change and accountability in policing. Now, 
the reality that minorities are treated differently by police is seemingly impossible to 
ignore. But the Supreme Court continues to ignore it.  
 
1. The Summer of 2020 Brought New Awareness to the Issue of Law 
Enforcement’s Mistreatment of the Black Community  
  
In 2020, the public constantly watched in horror at the seemingly endless high-
profile cases in which police killed unarmed Black men and women in situations where 
deadly force was unnecessary. With each case, protestors took to the streets to demand 
justice in record numbers. One estimate found that from June 8 to June 14, roughly 26 
million people in the U.S. said they participated in a Black Lives Matter protest.134  
The now notorious murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis was the major catalyst 
for the protests and demands for justice by the Black Lives Matter movement. Floyd, a 
Black man, had allegedly used a counterfeit $20 bill at a grocery store, and the police 
were called.135 After being placed in handcuffs, Mr. Floyd laid on the ground while 
Police Officer Derek Chauvin knelt on his neck for an astounding 9 minutes and 29 
 
133 Dhrumil Mehta, National Media Coverage of Black Lives Matter Had Fallen During the Trump Era —Until Now, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, (Jun. 11, 2020), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/national-media-coverage-of-black-lives-
matter-had-fallen-during-the-trump-era-until-now/.  
134 Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui and Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in U.S. 
History, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-
floyd-protest-crowd-size.html.  
135 Evan Hill, et. al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (May 31, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html.  
 28 
seconds.136 Unfortunately, this resulted in the death of George Floyd.137 Amid global 
calls for justice and accountability for this public execution, Chauvin was charged with 
unintentional second-degree murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree 
manslaughter.138 In April 2021, Chauvin was found guilty on all counts.139  
Even in situations where Black men don’t engage in any illegal conduct 
whatsoever, routine interactions with police can still result in their deaths. The 2019 
death of Elijah McClain is illustrative. McClain, a twenty-three-year-old Black man, was 
walking home from a convenience store in Aurora, Colorado when police officers 
approached him.140 McClain was wearing an open-faced ski mask due to his anemia, 
which often made him feel cold, but evidently this made someone call the police to report 
a “suspicious person.”141 When police ordered McClain to stop, he responded by saying 
““I have a right to walk to where I’m going.”142  This should have ended the interaction, 
because McClain’s swearing of a ski mask likely did not give rise to any reasonable 
suspicion. Wearing a ski mask is not illegal, and the 911 caller did not allege there was 
any sort of illegal conduct going on.143 McClain was unarmed and simply walking 
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home.144 Despite McClain’s attempt to terminate the interaction with officers, they 
tackled him to the ground within ten seconds of first asking him to stop, and put him in a 
“carotid hold”, which entails an officer applying pressure to the side of a suspect’s neck 
in order to temporarily cut off blood flow to the brain.145 The officers then called 
paramedics, who injected McClain with 500 milligrams of Ketamine to sedate him while 
officers held him down.146 McClain suffered a heart attack on the way to the hospital and 
died two days later, after he was declared braindead.147 Despite this incident occurring in 
2019 and all officers being cleared of any wrongdoing, the death of George Floyd and the 
massive protests it sparked in the summer of 2020 led the Governor of Colorado to issue 
an executive order designating the State Attorney General to “investigate and, if the facts 
support prosecution, criminally prosecute any individuals whose actions caused the death 
of Elijah McClain.”148  
 The 157-page incident report was released in February 2021, and it alleged large-
scale misconduct by the police.149 First, the report contends that the Aurora Police 
Department “stretched the record to exonerate the officers rather than present a neutral 
version of the facts.”150 Second, it found that the police escalated “what may have been a 
consensual encounter with Mr. McClain into an investigatory stop”151 (or Terry stop), 
which was not warranted because “walking away from a police officer when told to stop, 
standing alone, is not sufficient” to trigger reasonable suspicion.152 Finally, the report 
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noted that the 500 milligrams of ketamine the paramedics injected into McClain to sedate 
him was inappropriate in light of the fact that McClain “did not appear to be offering 
meaningful resistance in the presence of EMS personnel.”153 In fact, the report found 
McClain instead to be “crying out in pain, apologizing, explaining himself, and pleading 
with the officers.”154 The report also said that the 500 milligram dosage to be “based on a 
grossly inaccurate and inflated estimate of McClain’s size.”155  
Despite the shocking amount of misconduct alleged in the report, none of the 
officers faced any criminal charges for their actions, and only one of them was fired.156 
The only other disciplinary action was for three officers who were not involved with the 
incident, who were fired because while standing in front of a memorial for Elijah 
McClain, they took a picture of themselves smiling happily while one of the officers 
reenacted the type of chokehold used on McClain on the other officer.157 They then sent 
the photo to one of the officers involved in McClain’s death.158  Many accurately saw this 
as police mocking the death of McClain, which only strengthened calls for police 
accountability and disciplinary action. McClain’s family summed up the entire incident 
and aftermath appropriately as “a textbook example of law enforcement’s disparate and 
racist treatment of Black men.”159 These “textbook examples” are becoming far too 
frequent and serve as a reminder that minority communities have legitimate reasons to 
fear any contact with law enforcement because they do not want to be the next Elijah 
McClain. This reality should be reflected in the Supreme Court’s seizure jurisprudence.   
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2. Search Doctrine has been readily revisited and adapted by the Supreme Court, 
but it has not done the same with Seizure.  
 
Revisiting and rethinking Fourth Amendment issues are not rare for the Supreme Court 
when it comes to the search context. Since the early 20th century, the Court has dealt with new 
technologies and police methods used to search by drawing new lines and creating new 
exceptions in attempt to square search doctrine with the realities of the modern age. Each time 
the Court has been presented with new knowledge about how or where police search, it has 
attempted to fit this new knowledge into their existing search doctrine framework.160 But the 
same cannot be said of its seizure jurisprudence. Comparing the two, it’s clear that the Supreme 
Court is allergic to reexamining seizure doctrine—primarily because it would necessarily entail a 
conversation about race, which it has persistently maintained has no place in Fourth Amendment 
Analysis. It is time to change that.  
As new technology has developed over the years, the Supreme Court has been forced to 
weigh in on the constitutionality of these technologies when law enforcement uses them to 
search. For example, in the landmark Fourth Amendment case of Katz v. United States,161 the 
Court upended its search doctrine, which until that point required officers to physically trespass 
on a suspect’s property before it could be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.162 But Katz, 
which involved wiretapping a defendant’s conversation in a phone booth, revolutionized search 
doctrine by recognizing that new technologies enabled law enforcement to listen in on private 
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conversations without trespass, and search doctrine needed to be updated to reflect that.163 Thus, 
a new search framework was born and still exists today. That is, a search occurs when a 
defendant has a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as objectively 
reasonable, and law enforcement violates this expectation.164 Because the defendant in Katz had 
a subjective expectation that his conversation in a phone booth would be kept private, and 
society would recognize that as reasonable, police’s wiretapping of his conversation without a 
warrant was deemed an unreasonable search violative of the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
trespass.165 
Katz is just one of many examples of the Supreme Court catching up with new 
technologies in its search jurisprudence. The advent and wide use of the Automobile in the early 
20th century forced the Court to carve out an entirely new exception to the warrant requirement 
when it came to searching automobiles.166 This automobile exception alone has spawned 
numerous cases concerning issues such as when police can search a car or objects in a car 
without a warrant.167 It also necessarily brough up the issue of what constitutes an automobile 
when it comes to mobile homes, which can be used as both home and automobile.168 Similarly, 
the advent and widespread use of cellular phones meant the Supreme Court had to update their 
search doctrine and issue rulings on the constitutionality of warrantless searches of both 
smartphones (such as iPhones and Androids commonly used today), and more outdated flip-
phones.169 The Court held that warrantless searches of either phone are prohibited by the Fourth 
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Amendment, due to the overwhelming amount of private information stored on smartphones in 
the modern age.170 Additionally, because of the modern smartphone’s ability to reveal its user’s 
location through cell-site location information (CSLI), the Court as recently as 2018 weighed in 
on the constitutionality of searching this information without a warrant.171 Again, the Court 
found such a search unreasonable and unconstitutional because it violated the same privacy 
framework it created in Katz.172  
An opposing argument can be made that by inventing new doctrines such as reasonable 
suspicion and the reasonable person test, the Court actually has been revisiting and adapting 
seizure doctrine. But these changes have led us to this precise moment. As outlined above, these 
changes have been unbelievably deferential to law enforcement and have lowered the quantum 
of proof necessary for the police to start and escalate interactions with civilians, and a 
disproportionate amount of those civilians are Black. In contrast to some of the more equitable 
and defendant-friendly decisions that operated to protect and expand the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, the Court’s fundamental seizure decisions 
like Terry, Mendenhall, and Whren did just the opposite. It is precisely because of these 
decisions that we so desperately need change in the seizure context. They have resulted in the 
ability of law enforcement to target and seize minority groups despite little to no evidence of 
wrongdoing and empowered police officers to become judges, juries, and executioners. Just as 
the Court has changed course in the wake of new realities in the search context, it must do the 
same in the context of seizure by acknowledging the harassment its decisions have forced 
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minority communities to endure. The Court played a major role in breaking the trust between law 
enforcement and the Black community, and now it must work to repair it.  
3. The Collateral Cost Arrest in the Modern Age  
Another important reason why seizure doctrine must be updated is the fact that the cost of 
being arrested has changed since both the ratification of the Fourth Amendment and even the era 
where many foundational seizure cases like Terry, Mendenhall, and Bostick were decided. This 
is because, due to the increasingly widespread use of electronic records that were introduced 
close to the turn of the 21st century, virtually anyone with access to the internet can obtain an 
individual’s arrest record  anywhere and at any time. Arrest records are public records, but before 
the internet made digital records possible, accessing any given individual’s record meant actually 
going to the agency responsible for keeping the record and requesting it. But in today’s world, 
that’s no longer the case. According to a 2021 study published by Cambridge University, every 
year in the United States, over ten million arrests, 4.5 million mugshots, and 14.7 million 
criminal court proceedings are digitally released at no cost.173 The fact that anyone can now 
access these records easily means the cost of being arrested has increased.  
In addition, being arrested can prohibit one from obtaining employment or occupational 
licenses. A survey by the Society for Human Resource Management reported that 73 percent of 
employers conducted background checks on all applicants.174 The ease with which criminal 
records can be obtained online makes these checks quick and effortless, but the research shows 
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this may not be necessary, as “most managers and HR professional report that the ‘quality of 
hire’ for workers with criminal records is as good or better than that of those without records.”175 
The ability to quickly obtain arrest records, along with most employer’s unwillingness to hire 
someone with an arrest record, has a particularly negative effect on minority communities. 
According to data from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), arrest rates 
for the African American and Latinx communities are two to three times higher than their 
proportion of the population.176 This is likely because of the disparate treatment these groups 
receive from law enforcement. More minorities being arrested equates to less minorities in the 
workforce. It’s unlikely that the Supreme Court could have envisioned that  arrest records would 
be so ubiquitous when it issued major rulings on seizures and arrests in the 1960s, 1970s, and 
1980s. But the decisions from that era are the rules that modern arrestees must play by. The law 
should be updated to reflect that. The fact that the Court prefers to keep subjectivity out of the 
Fourth Amendment plays no role here, as it is objectively the case that the costs of arrests have 
increased.  
IV: PATHWAYS TO CHANGE 
 The nebulous nature of seizure doctrine has led to issues in police accountability and 
opportunities for relief. One of the primary methods to obtain relief for someone harmed by an 
unreasonable seizure by police is 42 U.S.C. §1983, which allows individuals the right to sue state 
government employees for civil rights violations.177 This includes police officers who employ 
excessive or unreasonable force on a suspect. However, because the constitution only protects 
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against unreasonable seizures, a person filing a § 1983 claim against a police officer must first 
show that they were “seized” under the meaning Fourth Amendment. Thus, the more difficult it 
is for the Court to determine what constitutes a seizure, the easier it is for police to escape §1983 
liability. The recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Torres v. Madrid178 illustrates this point and 
represents a positive change in how the Court analyzes certain seizures, which will allow for 
more §1983 claims to proceed.  
A. The Stunted Development of Seizure Doctrine Inhibits Civil Liability of 
Police, but Torres is a Step in the Right Direction.  
 
On the night of July 15, 2014, Roxanne Torres was standing outside of an 
apartment complex when two police officers approached her to ascertain whether she was 
the subject of an arrest warrant (she was not).179 Torres, who was going through 
methamphetamine withdrawal at this time, feared the officers were carjackers, and acted 
on that fear by quickly getting into her car and stepping on the gas pedal. 180Neither 
officer was standing in the way of the vehicle, and thus their safety was not jeopardized 
by Torres’s driving away.181 Despite this, the officers took out their pistols and fired 13 
shots at Torres’s car. Two of these 13 bullets hit Torres’s back, which lead to temporary 
paralysis in her left arm.182 Miraculously, she was still able to escape and drive 75 miles 
to a different county, where she sought medical treatment for her serious injuries.183 She 
was airlifted back to a hospital close to where the shooting incident took place, where she 
was eventually arrested and plead no contest to aggravated fleeing from a law 
 
178 141 S. Ct. 989 (2021).  






enforcement officer and assault on a peace officer.184 She also filed a § 1983 claim 
against the officers, seeking damages for her injuries and alleging that the officers applied 
excessive force, making their shooting at her an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.185  
One might think that Torres’s claim would succeed due to the lack of justification 
for the barrage of bullets the officers subjected her to. But this is where the murky waters 
of seizure law again rear its head, because in order to even get to the question of whether 
the officers used excessive force, the threshold question of whether Torres was “seized” 
had to be answered. The officer’s actions may have been unreasonable, but if they did not 
seize Torres, her claim fails. Thus, 250 years after the founding and ratification of the 
Fourth Amendment, fundamental questions surrounding seizure law remain, including 
the one at issue in Torres: whether the application of physical force is a seizure if the 
force, despite hitting its target, fails to stop the person.186 The District Court granted 
summary judgment to the police officers and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that their actions did not constitute a seizure because “a suspects 
continued flight after being shot by police negates a Fourth Amendment excessive-force 
claim.”187 This result is an illustration of how the shortcomings and lack of development 
of seizure doctrine forecloses avenues for relief. Thankfully, the U.S. Supreme Court 
broke its centuries-long silence on this issue when it granted certiorari in Torres and 
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 In a 5-3 decision, the Supreme Court in Torres held that the application of 
physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the 
person does not submit and is not subdued188 (Justice Amy Comey Barrett was not yet 
confirmed at the time of oral argument and took no part in the case). As a result, Torres 
was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and could proceed with her 
§1983 claim against the officers who shot her. This is an extremely important decision in 
the development of seizure doctrine, and one that will have an impact on a police 
officer’s decision to use deadly or unreasonable force in the future.  
 As usual, the Supreme Court framed their analysis of the seizure question in 
Torres around founding-era and common law understandings of what constitutes a 
seizure.189 In its analysis, the court found and cited ample evidence from the common law 
that a “seizure” or arrest can be accomplished by merely touching the subject. For 
example, the decision, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, states that “[t]he common law 
rule…that the application of force gives rise to an arrest, even if the officer does not 
secure control over the arrestee—achieved recognition to such an extent that English 
lawyers could confidently and accurately proclaim that “all the authorities, from the 
earliest time to the present, establish that a corporal touch is sufficient to constitute an 
arrest, even though the defendant do not submit.””190 The majority goes on to find that 
America has adopted this “mere-touch” rule since the founding era, and that “the slightest 
application of force could satisfy this rule.”191 The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, reads these old English and American cases to mean that there must be a 
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literal “laying in of hands on the suspect” to constitute a seizure, and since the officers in 
Torres used a gun to shoot bullets from a distance as opposed to actually touching Torres 
with their hands, there was no seizure.192 The majority disagreed, stating that “we see no 
basis for drawing an artificial line between grasping with a hand and other means of 
applying physical force to effect an arrest.”193  
  The Torres majority also reached its conclusion by deferring to Antonin Scalia’s 
majority opinion in California v. Hodari D194, which synthesized a variety of old English 
and common law cases and concluded that “the mere grasping or application of physical 
force with lawful authority” is an arrest/seizure under the common law, “whether or not it 
succeeded in subduing the arrestee.”195 Scalia found this proposition to be consistent with 
the Framer’s intentions when they wrote the Fourth Amendment, and the Torres majority 
agreed: “At the end of the day, we simply agree with the analysis of the common law of 
arrest and its relation to the Fourth Amendment set forth thirty years ago by Justice 
Scalia, joined by six of his colleagues, rather than the competing view urged by the 
dissent today.”196 Without these remarks from Scalia in Hodari, it’s not clear that Torres 
would be decided the way it was.  
B. Likelihood of Supreme Court to Reconsider Seizure Doctrine in Light of 
Race and other Demography 
 
Torres suggests that movement on seizure doctrine is possible, but movement in light of 
known disparities on the basis of race is highly unlikely. This is because Torres represents a 
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continuation of the Court’s commitment to keeping the Fourth Amendment as objective as 
possible, and the more objective the analysis, the less likely race can be considered as a factor 
when reviewing the actions of both officer and defendant. The Torres Court is clear on its 
commitment to objectivity, averring that “we rarely probe the subjective motivations of police 
officers in the Fourth Amendment context…nor does the seizure depend on the subjective 
perceptions of the seized person.”197 So, while the Court will now find a seizure where a fleeing 
suspect is shot by police, there will be no analysis or recognition of race as a possible motivation 
for the officer’s decision to shoot or the suspect’s decision to flee.  
While the Court decides every seizure case as though all races are treated the same by 
police, the facts tell a different story. In reality, Black individuals are much more likely to be 
killed while interacting with police than white people. According to a recent study, victims of 
fatal police shootings that identify as Black, Indigenous, or People of Color (BIPOC), whether 
armed or unarmed, had significantly higher death rates compared with whites.198 Among the 
unarmed victims, Black people were killed at three times the rate of white people.199 These 
numbers remained unchanged from 2015 to 2020.200 Dowin Boatright, one of the authors of the 
study and an assistant professor of emergency medicine at Yale University, characterized this as 
a “public health emergency,” and stressed the importance of treating it as such.201 Another study 
found that the lifetime risk of being killed by police use of force was greatest among Black men, 
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who are about 2.5 times more likely to be killed by police than white men.202 Black women are 
about 1.4 times more likely to be killed by police than white women.203 The study also found that 
about 1 in 1,000 Black men and boys will be killed by police.204 Whether the Supreme Court 
wants to recognize it or not, these statistics show that police officers are more likely to fire their 
weapons when interacting with Black people than white people, and that Black people should 
have more cause for concern than white people when stopped by police. But by keeping seizure 
doctrine objective, the Court ignores these realities and perpetuates a fantasy where all races 
receive equal treatment by police and are expected to act as such.  
 Despite its adherence to excluding race and other demography from the Fourth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has been willing to consider certain demographics in some Fifth 
Amendment Contexts. For example, in J.D.B v. North Carolina,205 the Supreme Court held that 
when a court is tasked with determining whether a juvenile suspect was in custody at the time 
they were questioned, that court must take the juvenile suspect’s age into consideration.206 
Usually, the custody test for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes mirrors the purely objective 
reasonable person test employed for seizure in the Fourth Amendment context. That is, a person 
is in “custody” when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would not feel free to 
terminate the conversation with police and leave.207 But in J.D.B., the Court found this inherently 
unfair as applied to juveniles they differ from adults in their mental and emotional processes: “to 
ignore the very real differences between children and adults would be to deny the full scope of 
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the procedural safeguards that Miranda guarantees.”208 The Court also pointed to studies 
showing that the risk of involuntary confessions is higher among juveniles.209 The present-day 
Supreme Court should take a page out of the J.D.B. Court’s playbook and apply similar 
reasoning to minority communities in the seizure context. The fact that juveniles don’t yet have 
the mental facilities to process interactions with police in the same way reasonable adults do can 
be compared to the fact that the Black community is targeted and killed by police at a 
disproportionately higher rate than whites. Both amount to important differences in the way a 
specific group handles interactions with police, and both—not just age—should be considered to 
afford the Black community the procedural safeguards of the Fourth Amendment.   
C. Options Without Supreme Court Intervention 
In the likely event that the Supreme Court does not update the law to better reflect 
the difference in experiences that minority communities have with law enforcement, there 
are still ways to address and alleviate the issue. Many of these involve States directly 
limiting the police practices that have been deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court. 
Some states have already enacted police reform in the wake of the murder of George 
Floyd, doing for themselves what the Supreme Court will not do on a Federal level. 
Sixteen States have restricted neck restraints, five States have restricted no-knock 
warrants, ten States have mandated that all police officers wear body cameras or provide 
funding for body cameras, and four States have put limitations on officer immunity.210  
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On a Federal Level, democrats in the House of Representatives took advantage of 
their majority in March 2021 to pass what has been called “the most significant federal 
intervention into law enforcement in years.”211 The legislation would accomplish many of 
the above goals of some States who have decided to place limitations and restrictions on 
certain excessive law enforcement techniques. Namely, restricting qualified immunity to 
make it easier to prosecute police for misconduct, restrictions on the use of deadly force 
that is used frequently and disproportionately on Black people, and banning chokeholds 
like the one that resulted in the death of Elijah McClain.212 The bill only narrowly passed 
in the House by only eight votes, and only one republican voted for it.213 The republican 
party has made opposition to the bill one of their primary positions, and both minority 
leaders of the House and Senate, Kevin McCarthy and Mitch McConnell have spoken out 
against the bill, warning their party that its passage would lead to “defunding the 
police.”214 Still, because of this intense and passionate republican pushback, the bill is not 
likely to become law.215  
One of the best ways to combat the police’s predilection for targeting the Black 
community is to reduce the overwhelming number of laws that enable them to stop 
civilians in the first place. As Whren held, police perform a pretextual stop on a vehicle 
for any traffic violation, no matter how minor the offense. Another Supreme Court case, 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, held that police have discretion to arrest drivers for any 
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full constitutional authority to pretextually stop drivers for a minor traffic violation and 
then arrest them. They have unsurprisingly used this authority to target minorities. The 
only way to address this issue without Supreme Court intervention is to change State laws 
by decriminalizing some of the conduct that Police have taken advantage of to stop and 
arrest Black people.  
States and cities have done just that. For example, the State attorney for the City 
of Baltimore recently decided to stop prosecuting minor crimes such as drug possession 
and prostitution.217 The reason for this, she said, was that “when we criminalize these 
minor offenses that have nothing to do with public safety, we expose people to needless 
interaction with law enforcement that, for Black people in this country, can often lead to 
a death sentence.”218 Baltimore is not the only city making these types of changes. The 
city of Berkeley, California, in reaction to research that showed Black drivers in the city 
were about six times more likely to be stopped than white drivers, recently prohibited 
police officers from pulling over drivers for minor offenses such as not wearing a 
seatbelt, misuse of high beam headlights, and expired registrations.219 In another 
example, a recent Virginia law limited the minor traffic violations for which officers can 
stop vehicles. It also prohibited police from searching stopped cars simply because they 
smell marijuana.220  
The decriminalization or legalization of marijuana can also be an effective 
method of reducing the disproportionate number of Black individuals arrested and 
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imprisoned. According to data reported by the ACLU, white and Black people use 
marijuana about the same, but are not arrested at the same rates. In fact, the data reveals 
that Black people have been nearly four times more likely than whites to be arrested for 
possession of marijuana.221 In some States like Iowa, Minnesota, and Illinois, this number 
is closer to eight times more likely.222 Even though marijuana is still illegal at the Federal 
level, many states have taken steps to combat the over-prosecution and high arrest rates 
for possession of marijuana by decriminalizing or legalizing it. As of April 2021, 
marijuana is legal in 17 states and Washington, D.C.223 Another 13 states have 
decriminalized it.224 Early data of stop rates in these states are promising. For example, 
after legalizing marijuana, Washington and Colorado saw dramatic drops in search rates, 
not just for Black drivers but for all drivers overall.225 Hopefully, the recent trend of 
legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana at the State level, along with the implementation 
of laws that restrict the ability of police to search vehicles simply because they claim to 
smell marijuana, will result in less arrest rates and less opportunities for the police to 
harass minority communities.   
CONCLUSION 
 The Supreme Court needs a wake-up call. In the same way that it has periodically 
adapted the Fourth Amendment to account for new realities in the realm of technology in 
search law, it must do the same to account for new realities in the realm of race in seizure 
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law. Statistics showing the disparate treatment, harassment, targeting, and unjustified 
killing of racial minorities, coupled with current events causing the U.S. to rethink the 
legality of police practices that lead to these statistics, should serve as the information the 
Court needs to make a change. Seizure doctrine has strayed away from what the Founders 
intended when they wrote the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable suspicion and 
reasonable person tests are inherently unreasonable. How many more minorities must 
unnecessarily die at the hands of police before the Supreme Court decides to do 
something about it? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
